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Using the birth certificates data from the Vital Statistics of the USA between 1968 and 1999, 
we construct state level panel data of different measures of fertility and examine the change 
in divorce laws. Total fertility declined in states that introduced unilateral divorce, which 
makes dissolution of marriage easier. Most of this effect is due to a decline of out-of-wedlock 
fertility. We suggest an explanation (and provide supportive evidence for it) based upon the 
effect of divorce laws on the probability of entering and exiting marriage. Women planning 
to have children marry more easily with an easier “exit option” from marriage. Thus, more 
children are born in the first years of marriage, while the total marital fertility does not 
change, probably as a result of an increase in divorces and marital instability. The effect of 
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The introduction of “no-fault” divorce has been one of the most significant changes in 
the structure of the American families of the last thirty years. Unilateral “no fault” divorce 
laws allowed one spouse to obtain dissolution of marriage without the consent of the other:  
divorce became much easier. The effect of this change in the law has been widely studied 
with reference to the frequency of divorce and marriage rates. But not much is known on its 
effect on fertility: after all, marriage and divorce must have some effects on the number of 
children.  
This is what we find. We first look at the effect of unilateral divorce laws on total 
fertility, uncovering a significant and large negative effect on fertility rates.  If this effect 
came from fertility in wed lock that might be explained by marriage instability which lower 
the propensity to invest in children (Becker, 1981; Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977). But, 
somewhat surprisingly, most of the reduction in fertility,  comes from reduction in out of wed 
lock births. 
Our explanation is as follows. Imagine an unmarried woman contemplating child 
bearing (or in the extreme case already pregnant). Without unilateral divorce, marriage 
becomes an irreversible investment; couples are “locked in”. With unilateral divorce the risk 
of entering the “wrong” marriage is lower because the exit option is easier. So a woman  
contemplating parenthood may choose to enter marriage more easily with unilateral laws; as 
a result out of wedlock fertility goes down. Obviously this does not imply that couples stay 
married longer on average with unilateral divorce; on the contrary, some of these matches 
may be indeed “wrong” and end up in divorce.  
We present some supportive evidence for this story. First the number of never 
married women goes down with unilateral divorce. Second, the number of marriages per 
person is higher in unilateral states, so people marry more frequently. Third, fertility rates for 
newly wedded couples (in the first two years of marriage) go up with the adoption of 
unilateral laws; in a sense this include a sort of “shot gun marriage effect”: with  easier 
divorce, the incentive to fight the shot gun is lower.    2
These findings are therefore consistent with the view that when divorce is easier, 
individuals take more chances with marriage, especially at the time of childbearing. This 
effect makes welfare analysis of divorce laws even more complex than normally thought, and 
we do not venture into any of it. 
We are of course not the first to analyze empirically the effect of divorce laws. Many 
authors have studied the effects of these laws on divorce rates (Peters, 1986 and 1992; Allen, 
1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006), marriage (Rasul, 2004), children outcome (Gruber, 
2004; Johnson and Mazingo, 2000), labor supply (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002) and 
general well-being of the couple (Stevenson and Wolfers (2005) and Dee (1999)), with 
mixed results
2.  
The available evidence on divorce laws and fertility is instead scant and here lies the 
contribution of this paper.
3 We use the legislative history of divorce liberalization across 
states in the US to identify the effects of this reform on fertility rates.  Using births data from 
the Natality Files of the Vital Statistics of the US between the years 1968-1999, we fully 
exploit cross state and year variation in the timing of adoption of unilateral divorce to 
identify the causal effect of a change in divorce laws on fertility rates. The availability of 
virtually universal Vital Statistics data on fertility provides enough statistical power that 
could not be obtained relying exclusively on other datasets, including the 5 per cent sample 
available in the census data. We complement our analysis using census data from 1960 to 
                                                 
2 The impact of unilateral divorce legislations on divorce rates remains an open question. Peters (1986, 1992), 
using a cross-section of data on women, finds no effect. Allen (1992) and Friedberg (1998) obtain the opposite 
result using an alternative model specification and panel data recording all the divorces by state and year 
respectively, while Wolfers (2006) finds only a small long run effect of unilateral divorce regulations. In a 
different line of research, Dee (1999) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2005) examine the impact of unilateral 
divorce on spousal murders, self-reported domestic violence and suicide, with opposite results. Using a different 
empirical strategy, both Gruber (2004) and Johnson and Mazingo (2000) find that exposure to unilateral. 
divorce as a youth appears to worsen adult outcomes such as education, labor force participation and family 
income. Finally Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) analyze the impact of divorce law on labor supply, 
finding substantial evidence of a change in bargaining associated with a change in the laws. 
3 Some papers have been looking at the impact on childbearing for women exposed to unilateral divorce as a 
youth. Gruber (2004) and Johnson and Mazingo (2000) both found a rise in the number of children. We do not 
focus on this paper on the exposure to unilateral divorce as a youth, but on current unilateral divorce regime. 
Focusing on women resident on states that introduced unilateral divorce, Peters finds no impact of a change in 
the law on fertility; her result is probably driven by data limitation. She compares only one pre-unilateral 
divorce and one post-unilateral divorce year of treatment.    3
1990 to confirm that our results can be distinguished from pre-existing trends in fertility, and 
we combine birth certificates ad March CPS data to study the impact of the law on marital 
versus non-marital fertility and out-of-wedlock ratio, a result never studied in the literature. 
Finally, we construct a comprehensive series of marriage rates for the period 1956-1995, and 
use the Census 1980 5% State sample to analyze the fertility history of women in their first 
two years of marriage.  
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief overview of the legislative history of 
divorce laws in the USA, section two analyzes the relationship between fertility and divorce 
laws, section three sets up the empirical methodology. Section four contains the main results 
and specification checks, section five and six investigates more in details the mechanisms 
underlying our results on fertility and section seven concludes. 
 
2  Divorce Laws and Fertility 
 
Between 1968 and 1977 the majority of the states in the US passed from divorce with 
mutual consent to unilateral divorce. In the previous regime, a spouse’s desire to end a 
marriage was not a sufficient reason to be granted a divorce: the spouse petitioning a divorce 
had to prove not only that the other spouse was responsible for the marital breakdown, but 
also that him/herself was not even partly at fault for the marriage’s failure. Starting in the late 
1960’s the states began to enact several legal reforms that simplified legal difficulties in 
obtaining a divorce. At first, with “no-fault” divorce laws, divorce could be obtained upon 
mutual consent of the parties involved. Immediately after, or contemporaneously, unilateral 
divorce statutes made it possible for one spouse to obtain a divorce without the consent of the 
other
4. Table 1 summarizes the changes in the law in all US states.  
There has not been systematic evidence on the impact of divorce laws on fertility.  In 
theory, one view holds that children constitute “marital capital” (Becker, Landes and 
Michael, 1977.) Thus, a couple produces goods which are more valuable inside than outside 
                                                 
4 This paper focuses on unilateral divorce. We do not consider any issue related to the division of property; 
unilateral divorce was usually accompanied by an equal division of property, but not the other way around.   4
the relationship. By reducing the value of marriage, due to a higher probability of divorce, 
unilateral divorce law should imply lower fertility. Bargaining models (Brinig and Crafton, 
1994, Mc Elroy and Horney, 1981, and Lundberg and Pollak, 1996) also imply a reduction in 
fertility: according to these models all family decisions are made in strategic ways that 
depend on the enforceability of the contract and the outside opportunities of each partner. 
With unilateral divorce outside options become relevant since the contract is now not-
enforceable. The spouse with outside option has a better bargaining position and is able to 
obtain a larger share of the couple’s joint production. For that reason the other spouse will 
prefer to invest in market activities or in human capital at the expense of marriage specific 
investments, including children.  
All these models predict then a decline in marital fertility, assuming implicitly that 
the incentives for unmarried people remained unchanged. However, a change in divorce law 
could imply a change in the composition of individuals in the marginal marriage through a 
selection into and out of marriage.  There are potentially two effects:  If the cost of exiting a 
bad marriage goes down one may choose to enter marriage more easily.  On the other hand, 
if marriage is so easily broken, i.e. the value of commitment is diluted, why marry to begin 
with? 
The existence of selection makes the prediction of the impact of divorce law on 
fertility harder to identify.  Marital fertility could go up or down or stay the same depending 
upon the relative strength of different forces. First, if there are fewer children in bad 
marriages, (which are more likely to end sooner when divorce is easier) we should observe 
an increase in fertility due to a selection out of a bad marriage into a good one.  Second, since 
the cost of exiting marriage is now lower, people will be more likely to marry because they 
have an easier exit option.  In this case the quality of matches can increase or decrease: it is 
possible to imagine that a higher number of marriages will increase the probability of finding 
a better match, on the other hand people might be less careful in looking for a partner since 
they know that the cost of splitting is lower
5. Third, one may argue that since the “value of 
                                                 
5 There is conflicting empirical evidence on this effect. On one hand, Choo and Siow (2003) measure the gains 
to marriage over time, using the frequency of matches across different types of market participant and find a 
substantial decline from 1970 to 1980. On the contrary, Weiss and Willis (1997) and Mechoulan (2003) using 
(continued)   5
marriage” declines people choose not to get married, a point made by Rasul (2004). Marital 
fertility could then increase/decrease or stay the same, depending on the comparative strength 
of these effects.  
Lets’ now turn to out of wed lock fertility.  On the one hand, reduction in the cost of 
exiting marriage will make more people “attempt” a marriage match, especially those who 
plan parenting. Thus out of wedlock fertility should go down because some of those who had 
children out of wed lock before may now choose to marry if exit from marriage is easier.  
This also implies that when unilateral laws are introduced marital fertility rates should go up 
immediately after wed lock and that the number of never married women should go down.  It 
could also imply that the rate of marriage goes up, because more matches are tried at every 
point in time.   In other words, as divorce become easier, some of those contemplating 
childbearing will choose to marry, reducing out of wed lock fertility. On the other hand if the 
value of marriage goes down, people could decide to marry less and, therefore, have children 
out of wedlock.  
We will show below that the first effect vastly dominates. 
 
3  Data and Econometric Specification 
 
3.1. Data 
We use the births certificates of the National Vital Statistics of the USA to calculate 
different measures of fertility. The births certificates data contain individual records on every 
birth that took place in the United States between 1968 and 1999 to mothers ages 10 and 
older. Prior to 1968 micro data on birth certificates are not publicly available. Birth 
certificates contain information on mother’s characteristic including age, race, marital status 
and education.  We aggregate these data into cells defined by state of residence of the 
mother, race and age, to construct state level panel data of total fertility rates, birth rates, and 
the ratio of births-out-of-wedlock to total births and marital-non marital fertility from 1968 to 
                                                                                                                                                       
the National Study of the High School Class of 1972 and the CPS respectively find evidence of better matches 
associated with the introduction of unilateral divorce.   6
1999. The total fertility rate (TFR) is the standard way of measuring fertility. It estimates the 
number of children a cohort of 1,000 women would bear if they all went through their 
childbearing years exposed to the age-specific birth rates in effect for a particular time. The 
TFR is calculated using the methodology applied by the National Center for Health Statistics 
(described in the appendix). We construct state-year cells containing the average number of 
children for women in all their childbearing period.  The birth rate is defined as the total 
number of childbirths observed per 1,000 women of the appropriate demographic group; it is 
a crude measure of fertility but it would allow us to study the impact of the law for marital 
status.  The fraction of births out-of-wedlock is defined as the ratio of out of wedlock births 
over total births
6.  
Population estimates and age and race composition are obtained by the Bureau of the 
Census for the period 1968-1999.
7 We also combine birth certificates data with the March 
round of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the number of married-unmarried 
women by age and race using the CPS weights. CPS data are also used to construct the labor 
market and education variables at the state level. Since the micro data on birth certificates are 
available only from 1968, we complement our analysis using four decades of Census from 
1960 to 1990, to confirm that our results can be distinguished from pre-existing trends in 
fertility. Descriptive statistics for adopting and non-adopting states are reported in the 
appendix (Table A3). 
We construct a very comprehensive series of administrative data for marriages in the 
US from 1956 to 1995. Our data comes from the marriage certificates of the United States for 
the period 1968-1995 (the marriage certificate data cover roughly 44 states depending on the 
specific year, see Appendix for more details), moreover we complement the dataset with 
hand-entered data from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics for 1956-1967 and for those 
states that are not covered in the marriage certificates dataset for the period 1968-1995. The 
                                                 
6 Some states did not report the information on legitimacy status prior to 1979, (See Appendix 1 for details) 
7 Population estimates for the intercensal years are obtained by the U.S. Census Bureau at 
www.census.gov/popest/states 
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count of administrative data is used to construct crude marriage rates- the number of 
marriages per 1000 of the population
8. Our checks confirm that our marriage rates almost 
perfectly match the official numbers reported in the vital statistics. Finally, we use the 
Census 1980 5% State sample
9  to study the fertility history of women in their first two years 
of marriage. 
3.2. Econometric Specification 
We consider the following panel data regression of the log of the total fertility rate in 
state s at time t, ) log( st f , for the period 1968-1999: 
( ) st s s st t s st st t X U f ε δ η λ γ χ β + ⋅ + + + + = ) log(       (1) 
where  st U  is a dummy equal to one if state s has a unilateral divorce regime starting from 
year t,  s χ  and  t γ  refer to state and year fixed effects,  st X  is a set of controls and  t s ⋅ δ  
represents state specific trends, where t is a year trend.  
Prior to 1967, divorce was mutual in almost all the states in the US. Between 1967 
and 1987 almost two thirds of the states introduced unilateral divorce. Hence the causal 
effect of unilateral divorce in our specification is identified from variation across states, time 
and between adopting and non-adopting states. The impact of a change in divorce law is 
captured by the coefficientβ , which represents the change in fertility rate attributable to the 
legal change.  
Table I gives the year in which these laws were passed by state. We follow Gruber 
(2004) who codes divorce as unilateral when it requires the consent of only one spouse and is 
granted on grounds of irreconcilable differences.  Since there is some debate in the literature 
about this coding and how classify a state’s divorce laws, as well as the timing of the laws, 
we have tested our results with different available coding. Our results are robust.  We 
consider two specifications. In the first, we include state and year fixed effects, but ignore 
state-specific trends ( 0 = s δ ), in the second state-specific trends are included.  
                                                 
8 Data on the state population for the period 1956-1998 is obtained by Wolfers (2006) 
9 The 1980 5% State sample covers approximately 11,337,000 person records. Data can be downloaded from 
www.ipums.org.   8
Endogeneity is not the primary concern in our specification; we would not think that 
fertility decisions have an effect on the probability that a state passes a unilateral divorce law 
and influencing fertility trends did not seem a policy objective in the changes of the divorce 
laws. The most serious concern is that the introduction of unilateral divorce might capture the 
effect of coincident underlying social trends or omitted factors that have differential effects 
in adopting and non-adopting states.  
We address this concern by presenting results using age and race composition of the 
states to control for underlying demographic trends. We also control for availability of 
abortion, female education and labor force status, and a set of state-level control variables 
(such as state income per capita and unemployment rates), that capture the socioeconomic 
environment that vary across states in a nonlinear manner.  Finally the identification 
assumption could also be violated due to political endogeneity. Perhaps states adopting 
unilateral divorce legislation could be the one whose electorate has stronger preferences for 
marital dissolution (reflected in higher divorce rates, more unstable marriages and possibly 
lower fertility).  We test for the presence of such pre-trends before the passage of the law 
including additional dummies for negative years of exposure to unilateral divorce.  
 
4   Results 
 
4.1 Basic results 
 
Table II (columns 1a and 1b) examines our basic regression on the effect of divorce 
laws on total fertility rates, including state and year effects with and without state specific 
trends. With (column 1a) and without (column 1b) state-specific trends, we find that a change 
in divorce laws results in a significant decline in the fertility rates in adopting states. The 
effects are significant at the 1 percent level and imply a decline in fertility of the order of 3 
percentage points.  
The impact of divorce law in our regression might be inconsistently estimated 
because of omitted factors that have differential effects in adopting and non-adopting states. 
We start adding additional state and time varying covariates, including the log of the per   9
capita state income (in 1999 dollars) and the unemployment rate.
10 The absolute value of the 
coefficient of interest actually increases and remains highly significant (Columns 2a and 2b). 
The decline in fertility in adopting states could simply reflect the demographic 
composition of the female population changing in a differential way across adopting and 
non-adopting states. In Columns 3a and 3b, we control for race and age composition of the 
state. The effect of unilateral divorce on fertility remains negative and significant at the 1% 
level.   
An important candidate responsible for the decline in fertility in adopting states could 
be the increase in female labor participation and education, which reduce the gains of 
marriage and fertility. While these are important determinants of fertility rates, their inclusion 
in the regression does not alter our estimates of the effects of the divorce law, as shown in 
Table II columns 4a, and 4b.
11 In fact, the estimated impact of unilateral divorce gets larger 
(more negative) relative to the baseline specification.
12  
Divorce laws were changed close to the time of legalization of abortion which of 
course could have an effect on fertility.
13 In fact, Levine et al. (1996) find a reduction in 
fertility due to the legalization of abortion; interestingly Akerlof et al. (1996) find an increase 
in out-of-wedlock fertility caused by the disappearance of the “shot-gun-marriage”. We 
include in our regression a dummy for the introduction of abortion. While we found that, at 
least with the specification without state specific trends, abortion liberalization has been 
associated with a 5% decline in fertility (columns 5a, b), consistent with what found by 
Levine et al. (1996), its inclusion does not reduce neither the significance nor the magnitude 
                                                 
10  See Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) on the relationship between unemployment and fertility.  
11 Table A3 in Appendix also shows that there is not much difference in education, labor force status and other 
demographic characteristics in adopting and non-adopting states before and after 1972, which is the median 
year of the adoption of the unilateral law. 
12 We construct our controls at the state level using the March CPS data. For that reason, the sample size is 
smaller because fewer states are identified between 1968 and 1979 in the CPS. 
13 Abortion was legalized in five states in the US in 1970 (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York and 
Washington). Following the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion became legal in all states   10
of the impact of divorce laws on fertility. We also run a regression including age and race 
composition, labor market status and education as controls and the results remained 
unchanged; results are available. 
 
4.2 Robustness 
Next we checked whether the change in fertility followed the change in divorce 
regime and not the opposite. Perhaps states adopting unilateral divorce legislation could be 
the one whose electorate has stronger preferences for marital dissolution (reflected in higher 
divorce, more unstable marriages and possibly lower fertility). If these underlying 
preferences are responsible for the decline in fertility, then our estimates are amplifying the 
true impact of divorce law on fertility. To check for this, we include leads dummies to our 
regression for whether unilateral divorce will be introduced in 2 to 3 years time, or 4 or more 
year’s time (the omitted category is the year before introduction). The estimated coefficients 
on the lead dummies (reported in Table III, column 1a and 1b) are not significant and are 
very small, indicating that secular pre-trends are not responsible for the decline in fertility in 
adopting states. This evidence on timing also buttresses our causal interpretation of our 
results. The unilateral divorce dummy remains significant at the 1% level and with a 
coefficient of similar magnitude.  
There is also anecdotal evidence supporting the fact that the liberality of the States 
does not imply a higher marital dissolution. A story in the New York Times (based on an 
Associate Press report) highlights that the highest divorce rates are in the Bible Belt: "the 
divorce rates in these conservative states are roughly 50 percent above the national average 
of 4.2 per thousand people." The 10 Southern states with some of the highest divorce rates 
were Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Texas. By comparison nine states in the Northeast were among those 
with the lowest divorce rates: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
14 
                                                 
14 “Bible Belt Couples 'Put Asunder' More, Despite New Efforts”, The New York Times, May 21
st, 2001.    11
In our period of analysis fertility rates decline all over the USA. One possible 
interpretation is that adopting states started from a higher level of fertility and that what we 
are capturing in our regression is a convergence in fertility rates between adopting and non-
adopting states; in other words, regression to the mean may then simply explain why fertility 
declined more in adopting states. We control for this possibility in two ways. In Table III, 
columns 2a, b control for fertility level in 1968 interacted with a linear time trend; while 
columns 3a, b use the interaction between the fertility level in 1968 and time fixed effects. 
The effect of a change in divorce law remains negative and significant at the 1% level, even 
after controlling for the possibility of reversion to the mean. 
We finally check the robustness of our results restricting our sample to only adopting 
states and using alternative law coding for unilateral divorce (Tables IV and V). Dropping 
from the analysis the non-adopting states will allow us to identify the impact of divorce law 
only from variation in the timing of adoption among adopting states. We find that estimating 
only the variation due to the different timing of reform is sufficient to identify the impact of 
divorce law on fertility. This result is particularly important because it shows that the effect 
of unilateral divorce on fertility rates is not determined only by differences across adopting 
and non-adopting states, which could be due, despite our attempts to control for omitted 
variables, to other factors different than unilateral divorce. When we replicate our analysis 
with the alternative law coding by Friedberg (1998) and Johnson and Mazingo (2000) we 
again find that the impact of divorce law is significant at the 1% level, however the 
magnitude of the results is a bit lower if we follow Friedberg classification (Table V).  
We run OLS giving equal weights to each reform state; we control for the role of 
migration using population as a control (it could be that people who have preferences for 
lower fertility are concentrated in the most liberal states because of selective migration 
resulting from the introduction of unilateral divorce legislations), we finally run a 
specification using state specific quadratic trends.  Our specification survives all these 
robustness checks which are available upon request. 
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4.3. Dynamics 
In our analysis we use a unilateral dummy to capture the total impact of divorce laws 
on fertility.  Wolfers (2006) however points out how this simple dummy may not fully 
account for pre existing trends and post law trends. To resolve these problems he adds 
variables that model the dynamic response divorce quite explicitly. We follow his strategy 
imposing a more flexible structure in our specification, consisting of a series of dummy 
variables, for the first two years of the new law, for years three and four and so on. This 
specification will be also particularly useful to study the permanent effect of the introduction 
of unilateral divorce on fertility. To fully capture the entire dynamic response of the 
introduction of unilateral divorce on fertility we estimate the following regression:  




j st t X U f ε δ η λ γ δ β + ⋅ + + + + =∑ ) log(       (2) 
where 
j
st U  consists of a series of dummy variables equal to one for the first two years of 
adoption, 3-4 years of adoption, 5-6 years and so on. The estimated effects of unilateral 
divorce for a series of years after the introduction of the law are presented in Table VI. There 
is a large and significant reduction in fertility rate following the introduction of divorce and 
the effect is constant over time and does not disappear until 15 years after the introduction of 
divorce. While the effect without state specific trends is much higher (in the range of a 4% 
reduction) with state-specific trends the results are lower in the first two years and consistent 
with the magnitude found with the unilateral divorce dummy after 3 years.  
Another problem outlined by Wolfers (2006) is that if there are only few observations 
before the policy shock, those observations are not sufficient to identify pre-existing state 
trends. There are no micro data available to extend our analysis starting from the beginning 
of the 1960. We solved this problem by using four decades of Census data (from 1960 to 
1990) to check that our results are not biased by the lack of a sufficiently long pre-trend. We 
run a specification collapsing state-year-age cells using as a dependent variable the number 
of children ever born to women age 15-44 residents in those states that adopted unilateral   13
divorce.
15 We run the Census regressions with and without state-specific trends; we include 
state-specific trends for consistency with our previous regressions, however with census data 
the inclusion of state-specific trends is not a perfect solution since there are only four 
underlying time series observations (those trends are much better captured using the yearly 
panel data on fertility we constructed using the Vital Statistics).
16  We run the following 
regression: 
( ) t s a s t a t s a t s a st t s a t race U fertility , , , , , , ε δ γ μϕ γ χ ϕ φ β + ⋅ + + + + + + =    (3) 
  where all the variables are defined as before, plus race representing the percentage of 
black and white in the age-state-year cells,  a ϕ  and  t aγ ϕ are age dummies and age year 
interactions to control for differential time patterns by age. Since the unilateral divorce 
dummy varies only by state and year, we control for clustering on state of residence*year. 
The coefficient of unilateral divorce dummy, with and without the inclusion of state specific 
trend is still significant at the 5% level (again census data cannot give us the same statistical 
power provided by the Vital Statistics which record all the births occurred in the US). As for 
the magnitude, it implies an elasticity of 3.5% of the impact of divorce law on fertility. A 
regression with fertility using the vital statistics implies an elasticity of 3.6% (but for the 
period 1968-1999) (See Table VII column 2a and 2b).  Overall, our results suggest that the 
introduction of unilateral divorce led to a significant and robust reduction in fertility rates.  
 
5  In and out of wedlock fertility 
5.1. The impact of divorce laws on marital and non-marital fertility 
We start with the impact of divorce law on the out-of-wedlock fertility (the ratio of 
illegitimate births over total births).
17 Table VIII shows two specifications, one controlling 
                                                 
15 Our specification follows Gruber (2004) but we concentrate on women residents in states that introduced 
unilateral divorce laws and not to women exposed to unilateral divorce as a youth. 
16 We use fertility rather than log fertility because in the Census data fertility is measured as number of children 
ever born to a woman (zero is then a possible outcome). 
17 Note that the number of observations for the out-of-wedlock regression is lower than the fertility regression, 
since marital status is missing for some states and years (Table A1 in the Appendix documents the availability 
of this information for each state and year).   14
only for state and year effects (with and without state-specific trends) and the other which 
adds age and race composition of the state, education, labor market status and availability of 
abortion.
18 Columns 1a and 1b show a significant decline in out-of-wedlock ratio following 
the adoption of unilateral divorce, with column 1a suggesting an elasticity of the order of 6%. 
Columns 2a and 2b show that this estimate is robust to adding a rich set of controls.  
Note that the left hand side of the regressions of Table VII is defined as out of 
wedlock births over total births, i.e. out of births in wedlock plus marital births. Thus the 
ratio could go if out of wedlock births go down or marital births go up.  In order to address 
this issue we split our sample between marital and non-marital fertility.  
State-year level measures of the number of single and married people aged 15-44 are 
constructed from March CPS data. These measures are available from 1968 to 1999, but only 
the 12 largest states are covered during the 1970’s; this coupled with the lack of information 
on the marital status information for many states has the drawback of reducing the precision 
of our estimates compared to our regressions for fertility or out-of-wedlock fertility. Table X 
presents estimates of the effect of unilateral divorce on marital and non-marital log birth 
rates. The impact of unilateral divorce laws on the marital log birthrate is always 
insignificant, with or without the inclusion of state-specific trends. As for the non-marital 
birth rate, while the impact is not significant without the inclusion of state-specific trends, 
with the inclusion of state-specific trends is significant at the 1% level and implies a 
reduction of non-marital birth rates of the order of 7%.  
5.2. Results by Race 
There are significant differences in the pattern of fertility and marriage between Black 
and White women (see Neal, 2002). Table XI shows the results by race. The specification 
follows the one for fertility with the first column including only state and year effects as 
controls and column two controlling for the demographic shares of the state population, 
availability of abortion, education and labor market status plus the log of income and 
                                                 
18 As before, since we constructed some of the controls using the CPS which does not identify all the states 
before 1972, we loose a lot of observations with the introduction of additional controls.    15
unemployment at the state level. Fertility declines significantly up to 7% for white mothers 
with the introduction of unilateral divorce, but it does not affect black mothers.  
The fact that fertility is more responsive to changes in divorce laws for Whites than 
for Blacks suggests that divorce law leads to a greater selectivity in fertility decision among 
Whites. Given that blacks have lower marriage rates to begin with, these results indicate that 
the main difference between Blacks and Whites are driven by marriage selection, rather than 
by other factors a priori equally important in fertility decisions. 
 
6.  Choosing marriage to have children  
This is our story to explain the evidence above. When divorce becomes easier, the 
risk of marriage goes down. So women contemplating child bearing (or even already 
pregnant) choose to marry to avoid out of wed lock fertility, knowing that an unsuccessful 
marriage can be more easily broken. In turn, men will be more willing to marry for the same 
reason.  
In this section we provide additional evidence confirming that the decline in fertility 
could be due to selection into and out of marriage as a result of the introduction of unilateral 
divorce. First we show that the number of never married women goes down with unilateral 
divorce. This is consistent with the idea that women try marriage more easily with easier 
divorce. Second the number of marriages per person is higher in unilateral states, so people 
marry more frequently. Third fertility rates for newly married women (in the first two years 
of marriage) go up with the adoption of unilateral laws.  
To study the change in the number of never married women we use data from the 
March supplement of the Current Population Survey from 1962-1999. We construct state-
year cells containing the fraction of never married women for the age group 15-49. We 
regress these cell means on a dummy indicating the presence of unilateral divorce, age and 
race composition of the states, state and year effects. We also run a specification including 
education and labor market status as controls. The results show that the number of never 
married women declines with the introduction of unilateral divorce. Our estimates imply an 
elasticity of around 4%. The results are robust to the inclusion of a full set of controls; 
however with the inclusion of state-specific trends the coefficient remains negative but not   16
significant. This is consistent with the view that with easier divorce fewer women are never 
married. 
In addition, we would expect an increase in the number of marriages per person at 
every point in time. In order to test this hypothesis, we collect a unique series on the total 
number of marriages from 1956 to 1995 which we have described in section 3.  We define 
marriage rate as the number of marriages for 1,000 population. We run two panel 
regressions, one with a dummy for unilateral divorce, the other with dummies for number of 
years after the adoption. The results of Table XII show that the introduction of unilateral 
divorce significantly increases the marriage rate (columns 1a, 1b); the dynamic response of 
marriage to a change in law seems to appear about four years after the passage of the law. 
19This lag seems a reasonable consequence of learning about a new regime. 
If women choose marriage to have children we would expect not only a decline in 
out-of-wedlock fertility, but also an increase in fertility rates for just married women. To test 
this hypothesis we use the 5% state sample of the 1980 Census. The 1980 Census contains 
information on the age at first marriage and on the total number of children ever born to a 
woman. We can calculate the duration of marriage for women in their first marriage and see 
whether their fertility rates are higher in states with unilateral divorce. We regress the 
number of children ever born to a woman on a dummy for unilateral divorce, a quadratic for 
age and dummies for age in the basic specification, we then add employment status and 
education as a control. We concentrate on women in their first two years of marriages
20. As it 
                                                 
19 Our results are different from those by Rasul (2004) who reports a decline in the number of marriages as a 
result of unilateral divorce. Our marriage rates estimates almost perfectly match the official rates form the Vital 
Statistics. Rasul defines marriage rates dividing by the population bewtenn16 and 65 while we follow the 
standard practice and divide by total population. Our population data are the same as those by Friedberg (1998) 
and Wolfers (2006) and we can easily reproduce Wolfers’ results on divorces. Rasul uses Friedberg coding we 
use Gruber’s coding. 
20 We run the regression also restricting the sample to women in their first year of marriage and the results do 
not change   17
is apparent from Table XIII, fertility is significantly higher in the first two years of marriage 
for women living in states with unilateral divorce.
21 
An alternative explanation is that when marriages are less secure, children are used ad 
a “commitment device” to keep couple together. But this effect should imply an increase in 
marital fertility more generally, not only in the first two year of marriage. 
 
7. Conclusions 
  This is our “story”. As divorce becomes easier, people feel less locked in when they 
marry.  So when women consider having children (or are already pregnant) they are more 
willing to “try” marriage. Therefore out of wedlock fertility declines and marriage rates go 
up. In more colorful terms shot gun marriages are less threatening with an easier exit option!  
Evidence of marital fertility is instead inconclusive. One the one hand marital fertility may 
increase as a commitment device to keep couple together when divorce is easier; on the other 
hand the lower value of marriage makes investment in children more risky. 
The welfare implications of our results are of course very hard to evaluate. Reduction of out 
of wedlock fertility may be a social good, but society may “pay” for it with an increase in 
bad marriages and more divorces.  
 
                                                 
21 There is data caveat: the Census data allow us to check whether a woman has had a child before the end of 
her two year of marriage; it does not allow us take out children that were born before the marriage.   18
 
Data Appendix 
Birth Certificates data were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System of the 
National Center for Health Statistics. The births certificates data contain individual records 
on every birth that took place in the United States between 1968 and 1999. Prior to 1968 
micro data are not publicly available.  
The total fertility rate (TFR) estimates the number of children a cohort of 1,000 
women would bear if they all went through their childbearing years exposed to the age-
specific birth rates in effect for a particular time. We calculate the total fertility rate (TFR), 
using the methodology applied from the National Center for Health Statistics. According to 
this definition the “TFR is the sum of the birth rates by age of mother (in 5-year age groups) 
multiplied by 5. It is an age-adjusted rate because it is based on the assumption that there is 
the same number of women in each age group. A total fertility rate of 2,477 in 1968 for 
example means that if a hypothetical group of 1,000 women were to have same birth rates in 
each group that were observed in acute childbearing population in 1968, they would have a 
total of 2,477 children by the time they reached the end of the reproductive period (taken as 
age 49), assuming that all of the women survive at that age” (Vital Statistics of the United 
States, 1968, Volume I, Natality, Technical Appendix).  
The birth rate is defined as the total number of childbirths per 1,000 women in a 
certain population group. 
The fraction of births out-of-wedlock is defined as the ratio of illegitimate births over 
total births. The legitimacy status was not reported in several states from 1968 through 1979. 
The states not reporting legitimacy status are indicated in Table A1. 
We use the March Supplement of the Current Population survey from 1968 to 1999 
to construct our control variables, specifically race and age composition, labor market status 
and educational levels for women in the age group 15-49. We also use the CPS to construct 
the number of married and unmarried women by age and race. In 1962 the following states 
are missing: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. From 1968 to 1972 the following states, 
plus the District of Columbia, are identified: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,   19
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. Between 1973 and 1976 the 
following states, plus the District of Columbia, are identified: California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Texas. After 1976 and between 1963 and 1967 all states can be identified. 
All monetary variables are indexed at 1999 values. 
Marriage Certificates data were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System of 
the National Center for Health Statistics. The marriage certificates data contain individual 
records on every marriage that took place in the United States between 1968 and 1995. The 
data for 1968-1995 covers around 44 states, depending on the exact year (see Table A2 for 
details). Marriage certificates data includes date of marriage, state of residency and 
occurrence, education, previous marital status, number of marriages and age of bride and 
groom. We calculate the number of total marriages for each state and year from the micro-
data, and we complement our series by entering by hand the missing series. Specifically we 
have hand-entered data from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics for all the States for 
1956-1967 and for the states missing from the micro-data for 1968-1995. We construct a 
very comprehensive series reflecting a total count of administrative data of marriages 
reported to the NCHS for the period 1956-1995. We then define marriage rate as the total 










                                                 




Table A1. States not reporting legitimacy status, by year 
  1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
California  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Connecticut  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Georgia  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Idaho  X X X X X X X X X X     
Maryland  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Massachusetts  X X X X X X X X X X     
M i c h i g a n              X   X  
Montana  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Nevada        X X X X X X X X X 
New  Mexico  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
New  York  X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Ohio    X X X X X X X X X X X 
Texas            X  X  X 
Vermont  X X X X X X X X X X     









































Micro data available 
      
Alabama 1968-1995  Montana  1968-1995 
Alaska 1968-1995  Nebraska  1968-1995 
Arkansas   Nevada   
Arizona   New  Hampshire  1968-1995 
California 1968-1995  New  Jersey  1968-1995 
Colorado 1979-1995  New  Mexico   
Connecticut 1968-1995  New  York  1968-1995 
District of Columbia  1968-1995  North Carolina  1968-1995 
Delaware 1968-1995  North  Dakota   
Florida 1968-1995  Ohio  1968-1995 
Georgia 1968-1995  Oklahoma   
Hawaii 1968-1995  Oregon  1968-1995 
Idaho 1968-1995  Pennsylvania  1968-1995 
Illinois 1968-1995  Rhode  Island  1968-1995 
Indiana 1968-1995  South  Carolina  1971-1995 
Iowa 1968-1995  South  Dakota  1968-1995 
Kansas 1968-1995  Tennessee  1968-1995 
Kentucky 1968-1995  Texas   
Louisiana 1968-1995  Utah 1968-1995 
Maine 1968-1995  Vermont  1968-1995 
Maryland 1968-1995  Virginia  1968-1995 
Massachusetts 1968-1995  Washington   
Michigan 1968-1995  West  Virginia  1968-1995 
Minnesota 1971-1995  Wisconsin  1968-1995 
Mississippi 1968-1995  Wyoming  1968-1995 
Missouri 1968-1995     
The micro data on marriage certificates data were obtained from the Vital Statistics of the United States for the 
period 1968-1995; data is hand-entered for the states with missing data in the period 1968-1995, and for all the 
states from 1956 to 1967. 
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TABLE A3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ADOPTING AND NON-ADOPTING STATES, 
WOMEN 15-44 YEARS OLD, 





































































































Source: CPS- March Supplement, authors’ calculations; fertility has been calculated using Census data 
for 1960 and 1990, respectively 
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Alabama 1971  Montana  1973 
Alaska 1935  Nebraska  1972 
Arkansas   Nevada  1967 
Arizona 1973  New  Hampshire  1971 
California 1970  New  Jersey   
Colorado 1972  New  Mexico  1933 
Connecticut 1973  New  York  
District of Columbia    North Carolina   
Delaware 1968  North  Dakota  1971 
Florida 1971  Ohio  
Georgia 1973  Oklahoma  1953 
Hawaii 1972  Oregon  1971 
Idaho 1971  Pennsylvania   
Illinois   Rhode  Island  1975 
Indiana 1973  South  Carolina   
Iowa 1970  South  Dakota  1985 
Kansas 1969  Tennessee   
Kentucky 1972  Texas  1970 
Louisiana   Utah  1987 
Maine 1973  Vermont   
Maryland   Virginia   
Massachusetts 1975  Washington  1973 
Michigan 1972  West  Virginia   
Minnesota 1974  Wisconsin  1978 
Mississippi   Wyoming  1977 
Missouri      
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TABLE II  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 
























































                    
Legalized 
Abortion 





Empl. Status  
                 
Up to 12 years of 
schooling 
































































Year  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  yes yes Yes 
State  Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  yes  Yes Yes Yes  yes yes Yes 
State-specific 
Trends 
No  Yes No  yes  No Yes No  yes no Yes 
Age and Race 
Composition 
No  No No no Yes  Yes  Yes No  no No 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.88 0.95  .88  .96  0.92  0.96  .92  .96  0.88  .96 
Number of obs.  1632  1632  1632  1632  1320  1320  1320  1320  1632  1632 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Demographic controls are the shares of the total female population in age group a and of race r, in state s in year t, 
where the age groups are 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and race is white, black and other.   
Source: Total fertility rates are calculated using the Vital Statistics of the USA. Population estimates are taken from www.census.org and demographic controls are 
authors’ calculation from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Definition of total fertility rate is in the data appendix.    
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TABLE III  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE  
CONTROLLING FOR REVERSION TO THE MEAN AND PRE-TRENDS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (TOTAL FERTILITY RATE) 
 























         





Fertility 1968 x time dummies          yes  yes 






     






     
         
Year  Effects  yes yes yes Yes yes Yes 
State  Effects  yes yes yes Yes yes Yes 
State-specific trends  no  yes  no  Yes  no  Yes 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.88  0.88  .095  0.88  .96 
Number of observations  1632    1632  1632  1632  1632 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population weights.  Robust  standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Source: Total fertility rates are calculated using the Vital Statistics of the USA.    
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TABLE IV 
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 
SUB SAMPLE OF ADOPTING STATES 











    
Year Effects  Yes  Yes 
State Effects  Yes  Yes 
State-specific trends  No  Yes 
    
Adjusted 
2 R   .87 .95 
Number of observations  1088  1088 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population 
weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. The regression includes state unemployment and log (per capita income) as controls 
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TABLE V 
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE  
ALTERNATIVE CODING FOR UNILATERAL DIVORCE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (TOTAL FERTILITY RATE) 
 
      



























      
Year  Effects  yes yes yes Yes 
State  Effects  yes yes yes Yes 
State-specific  trends  no yes no Yes 
      
Adjusted 
2 R   .88  .88  
Number  of  observations  1632 1632 1632 1632 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population weights.  Robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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TABLE VI 
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 
DYNAMICS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (TOTAL FERTILITY RATE) 
 
Specification (1)  (2) 
































    
Year Effects  Yes  Yes 
State Effects  Yes  Yes 
State Trends, Linear  No  Yes 
    
Adjusted 
2 R   .89 .96 
Number of observations  1632  1632 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population 
weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Regressions include state unemployment and log per capita income as controls. 
















THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE 
CENSUS DATA AND VITAL STATISTICS 
 
  
Census 1960-1990:  
number of children ever born to 
women 15-44 years old 
 
 
Vital Statistics 1968-1999:  
Total fertility rate 
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 














      
Elasticity  3.5% 3% 3.6%  2.9% 
      
Year Effects  Yes  yes  yes  Yes 
State Effects  Yes  yes  yes  Yes 
State-specific trends  No  yes  no  Yes 
      
Adjusted 
2 R   .98 .98 .88 .96 
Number  of  observations  6113 6113 1632 1632 
For the Census data: regressions based on IPUMS data from the 1960-1990 Censuses (1960 State 1% sample, 
1970 Form one 1% state sample, 1980 and 1990 5% state sample). Women aged 15-44. All regressions 
control for race, state and age dummies and age*year dummy interaction and are weighted to reflect 
underlying micro data.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  Standard errors are clustered at the state*year level. 
For the Vital Statistics Regressions: Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated 
using state population weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 




















THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS 































        
Legalized 
Abortion 








     
Up to 12 years of 
schooling 






























        
Age and Race 
Composition 
     
Year Effects  Yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
State Effects  Yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
State-specific 
Trends 
No Yes no Yes 
        
Adjusted 
2 R   .96 .98 .96  .98 
Number of obs.  1481  1481  1233  1233 
   Out-of-wedlock ratio is defined as the ratio of births out-of-wedlock over total births. 
   Coefficients multiplied by 100. 
Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999. Estimated using state population 
weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels. Demographic controls are the shares of the total female population in age 
group a and of race r, in state s in year t, where the age groups are 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-
29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and race is white, black and other.   
Source: Birth rates for married and unmarried women are calculated using the Vital Statistics of 
the USA.   
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TABLE IX  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE LOG BIRTH RATE, BY MARITAL STATUS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (BIRTH RATE), WOMEN AGE 15-44 








































Education and Empl. 
Status  
              
Up to 12 years of 
schooling 
































Age and Race 
Composition 
No no yes  yes  no  no  yes yes 
Year Effects  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State Effects  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State-specific Trends  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
                
Adjusted 
2 R   .81 .89  .83  .90  .81 .89 .91  .94 
Number of obs.  1235  1235  1235  1235  1233  1233  1233  1233 
              Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999.  
              Estimated using state population weights.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
Source: Log (birth rates) is calculated using the Vital Statistics of the USA.  Married and single population is calculated from the March   
PS using CPS weight.   
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TABLE X  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE LOG BIRTH RATE, BY RACE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG (TOTAL FERTILITY RATE) 







































Education and Empl. 
Status  
              
Up to 12 years of 
schooling 
































Age and Race 
Composition 
no no Yes  yes  no  No Yes yes 
Year Effects  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
State Effects  yes  yes  Yes  Yes  yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
State-specific Trends  no  yes No  Yes  no  Yes No yes 
                
Adjusted 
2 R   .86 .95  .91  .96  .79 .93 .81  .93 
Number of obs.  1530  1530  1282  1282  1530  1530  1217  1217 
              Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1968-1999.  
Estimated using state population weights for white and black.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels.  
Source: Total fertility rates are calculated using the Vital Statistics of the USA.   
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TABLE XI  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE NUMBER OF NEVER MARRIED WOMEN 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FRACTION OF NEVER MARRIED WOMEN, AGE 15-44, 
CPS 1962-1999  









Education and Empl. 
Status  
    





Some college    -.3129*** 
(.0597) 
 
Fraction Employed    -.1242*** 
(.0293) 
 
Fraction Unemployed    .0452 
(.0817) 
 
Age and Race 
Composition 
 yes  Yes 
Year Effects  yes  Yes  Yes 
State Effects  yes  Yes  Yes 
State-specific Trends  no  no  Yes 
      
Elasticity 4%  3%  1% 
Adjusted 
2 R   .79 .85   
Number of obs.  1564  1564  1564 
                             Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1962-1999.  
Robust standard errors in   parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 
10% levels.  
Source: Fraction of never married women is calculated using the March Supplement of the 
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TABLE XII  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON THE MARRIAGE RATE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  
MARRIAGE RATES (NUMBER OF MARRIAGES PER 1,000 POPULATION) 








































Year Effects      Yes  Yes 
State Effects      Yes  Yes 
State-specific Trends      No  Yes 
Elasticity 2.3%  2.3%     
Adjusted 
2 R   .79 .89  .79  .89 
Number of obs.  1986  1986  1986  1986 
                       Panel data regression estimates, sample period 1956-1995. Nevada is excluded from the sample. 
Robust standard errors in   parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.  
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TABLE XIII  
THE IMPACT OF UNILATERAL DIVORCE ON FERTILITY DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF MARRIAGE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN TO WOMEN AGE 15-49, 
CENSUS 1980, 5% STATE SAMPLE 

























Education and Empl. 
Status  
  




Some college    .1803*** 
(.0076) 
Employed   -.4647*** 
(.0135) 
Unemployed   -.2496*** 
(.0147) 
    
State Effects  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted 
2 R   .10 .22 
Number of obs.  204,806  203,496 
                          Source: Census 1980, 5% State Sample 
  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Corrected for clustering at the state level ***, 
**and * respectively denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 